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THE WORK OF THE LOUISIANA
APPELLATE COURTS FOR THE
1965-1966 TERM
A Faculty Symposium

PRIVATE LAW
PERSONS
Robert A. Pascal*
Over sixty appellate decisions involving the law of persons
were rendered in the 1964-65 term. Most of these were consistent with prior acceptable interpretations and applications or
otherwise do not require comment here. Accordingly, the remarks below will be restricted to decisions which demand comment.
ALIMONY

In Walker v. Walker' the wife had been receiving alimony
pendente lite in the amount of $200 monthly for herself and the
children when the court rendered judgment (1) awarding a
separation from bed and board to the husband, (2) awarding
the wife alimony in the amount of $100 for the children, and
(3) discontinuing alimony in favor of the wife herself. The wife
appealed from the judgment of separation, but made no mention of appealing from the judgment so far as it pertained to
alimony. The court of appeal ruled the appeal from the judgment of separation had the effect of suspending the judgment
discontinuing alimony in favor of the wife; the Supreme Court,
however, reasoned that the award of alimony pendente lite had
been superseded by a new judgment denying the wife alimony,
that this judgment alone could be appealed, and that appeal
*Professor of Law, Louisiana

State University.

1. 246 La. 407, 165 So. 2d 5 (1964).
[459]

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

from a judgment denying alimony does not entitle the petitioner
to alimony pending the appeal.
It is true that if one sues for alimony and is awarded none,
the judgment denying alimony may be appealed, but the appeal
itself does not give the appellant a right to alimony pending its
outcome. Thus, if the wife in Walker is to be regarded as having sued for and been denied alimony, it is correct to conclude
that she could not be entitled to alimony during the appeal.
The writer submits, however, that this was not the situation in
Walker. The wife had been receiving $100 each month for herself as alimony pendente lite. Under the jurisprudence a judgment for alimony pendente lite continues after a judgment of
separation from bed and board unless it is superseded by another judgment on the subject. If the original judgment is replaced by a second, the second operates a change in the first
judgment which is itself the subject of an appeal, devolutive or
suspensive at the election of the party entitled under the original judgment. The situation is not different from that in which
a husband sues for reduction or termination of alimony previously awarded and the wife appeals suspensively from the judgment reducing or terminating her previous award. 2 Hence the
writer concludes that the wife in Walker should have had the
right to appeal, either devolutively or suspensively, from the new
judgment terminating her payments pendente lite.
There is a question, however, a procedural one, whether the
wife in Walker did appeal suspensively from the alimony judgment simply by appealing from the judgment on the issue of
separation from bed and board. The writer is inclined to the
view that in a case of this kind the mere fact of appeal on the
issue of separation should not be regarded as an appeal on that
of alimony. The two are separable issues and as such the subject of two judgments rather than one. Indeed, a wife similarly
situated may be dissatisfied with the separation judgment, but
content with that relating to alimony. Thus the husband should
be entitled to know whether the wife appeals from both judgments or only one of them, and he can be assured best of this
information if the wife is required to appeal expressly on each
of the issues.
Article 160 of the Civil Code as amended in 1964 allows ali2. See, for example, Derussy v. Derussy, 173 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1965).
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mony to the wife after divorce in certain circumstances if she
has not been at fault. The wife at fault, to use other words, is
not entitled to alimony. Randle v. Gallagher3 presents a most
important question in this respect. The wife had obtained a
separation from bed and board from the husband on the ground
of cruel treatment. Thereafter the parties were divorced on the
ground of living separate and apart for two years or more, a
ground which excludes the issue of fault for purposes of the divorce itself. The wife contended that the separation judgment
indicated her lack of fault and her entitlement to alimony after
divorce. The court of appeal, however, noting that the wife
could have been at fault to some degree and yet have obtained
the separation because of the greater fault of her husband, decided that alimony could not be given in such a case until the
wife proved she had been free from fault. The writer believes
this decision goes too far and suggests that the wife whose fault
has not been sufficient to prevent her from obtaining the separation should be entitled to alimony after divorce unless the husband can show additional substantial fault on her part subsequent to the separation judgment. If the wife's fault was such
that the husband was awarded the separation, she should be
denied alimony after divorce even if the husband subsequently
is at substantial fault, for then her fault was substantial in the
first place. Similarly, if a separation suit ends in a denial of
separation from bed and board because of the mutual fault of
the parties the wife should be denied alimony after divorce, for
here again her fault has been substantial.
FILIATION
4

Succession of Jene decided that a child born fifteen minutes
after the putative marriage of its parents was to be considered
legitimate. In reaching this conclusion the court of appeal reasoned that (1) a child born within one hundred and eighty days
of a valid marriage would be legitimate under (article 190 of)
the Louisiana Civil Code, that (2) such a child would be a child
"born of" that marriage, that (3) a child born in the same time
after a putative marriage should be considered "born of" the
putative marriage within the meaning of article 118 of the Civil
Code, and therefore (4) legitimate. The writer submits that the
conclusion appeals to the emotions but violates the texts of the
3. 169 So. 2d 224 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
4. 173 So. 2d 857 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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Civil Code for two reasons. First, the child born less than one
hundred and eighty days after a valid marriage is legitimate,l
not because it is "born of" the marriage, but because it is born
during marriage, as is specified in article 179 of the Civil Code;
indeed, under article 954 of the Civil Code this child is "legitimated by a marriage posterior to its conception." Thus, a
child is not "born of" a marriage unless it is conceived or presumed conceived during marriage. Secondly, article 118 limits
the effects of marriage to children "born of," that is to say,
conceived during, the putative marriage. The rule of article 118
is aimed at preventing a child conceived by a person believing
himself or herself to be married from being considered illegitimate; it is not aimed at the legitimation of children who are
illegitimate for a reason other than that the marriage during
which they were conceived is declared null. In this case the
child was not rendered illegitimate by the nullity of the marriage of its parents; the cause of its illegitimacy was its conception outside of marriage, and it remained illegitimate because
the marriage of its parents, which if valid would have provided
it with legitimate status, was null.
Although Dorsey v. Williamston is consistent with a long
line of decisions, the writer would feel negligent in his duty
as a professor of law if he did not reaffirm his conviction that
the interpretation of the law applied therein is both inconsistent
with the texts properly construed and productive of most grave
injustice. A child was conceived and born to a married woman
while living in open concubinage with a man not her husband.
Indeed, the child was conceived and born during a period of
living separate and apart which formed the basis of a divorce
judgment. Thereafter the wife and her paramour married and
presumably the child lived with them. The first husband, nevertheless, was considered its father and obliged to support it.
And, it may be added, at the husband's death the child will be
deemed entitled to a legitime. Once more the writer submits
that (1) articles 184-192 of the Louisiana Civil Code do not
apply when the child does not possess the appearance or reputation of being conceived by the husband of the mother, for
otherwise the provision in article 197 of the Civil Code would
be meaningless; that (2) there is no appearance or reputation
of conception by the husband of the mother when the mother
5. 170 So. 2d 773 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).

1966]

PRIVATE LAW

is living in open concubinage with a man not her husband; and
that (3) in this instance the presumption in article 209(3) of
the Civil Code, that the paramour is the father of the child,
should be applied." No doubt the long line of decisions to the
contrary' has been prompted by concern for the child; but this
concern is not enough to warrant imposing on a husband a child
very obviously not his, with all that entails by way of support,
possible delictual responsibility, and forced heirship, when the
texts of the legislation do not require it.
A second contention of the first husband of the mother was
that the marriage of the child's mother to the paramour, who
he alleged had informally acknowledged the child as his own,
legitimated him as the child of the paramour under the provisions of article 198 of the Civil Code. This contention was
plausible, at least, but the court of appeal dismissed it rather
summarily. Under the interpretation implicit in this action, article 198 would operate to legitimate only children born of a single
woman and a married man. It is submitted that more consideration should have been given to the first husband's argument,
for it would certainly have led to more substantial justice than
the court's construction of article 198.
PATERNAL AUTHORITY, TUTORSHIP, AND CUSTODY
In the writer's opinion, the appellate decisions continue to
show a marked and increasing divergence from the spirit and
letter of the legislation on paternal authority, tutorship, and
the relationship of the child to relatives more remote than his
parents. The comments below will show how decisions of the
1964-65 term manifested this divergence from the legislative
norm.
The Civil Code provides for awarding the custody of a child
to one of the parties pending a suit for separation from bed
and board, but it does not provide for the termination of paternal authority unless and until there is a judgment of separation
from bed and board. Thus, unless and until a separation judg6. See Pascal, comments on Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119
(1952), in 14 LA. L. REv. 121-23 (1953) and Pascal, Who Is the Papa? 18
LA. L. REV. 685 (1958). See also the summary remarks of Lloyd on Trahan v.
Trahan, 142 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), in 24 LA. L. REV. 171 (1964).
. 7. See particularly Succession of Saloy, 44 La. Ann. 433, 10 So. 872 (1892);
Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119 (1952) ; Trahan v. Trahan, 142
So. 2d 571 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
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ment is rendered, the father's will should prevail over that of
the mother, as article 216 of the Civil Code specifies. For this
reason the decision in Webber v. Webber,8 through which a father was deprived of the right to name his child born while a
suit for separation from bed and board was pending, must be
considered in violation of that article. It should not matter that
the estranged mother would have been annoyed at the father's
giving the child his own name. It is his right to do so.
Bond v. Bond9 involved a controversy between a legitimate
father and the child's stepmother pending suit for separation
from bed and board. This matter should have been settled on
the basis that the child was not subject to paternal authority
but to tutorship; that within the framework of our legislation
custody is normally an adjunct of tutorship; that a stepmother,
not being a blood relative of the child, is not even in the order
of call to the tutorship; and that the father can be excluded
or removed from the tutorship only for causes specified by law.
The stepmother's contention was completely without basis in the
legislation.
State v. Toole' O illustrates what the writer regards as an
abuse of the legislation under which a child might be declared
abandoned by a parent so as to deprive even those entitled to
his tutorship from obtaining his custody. A mother and her
child had been abandoned in fact by the husband and father.
On the mother's death, one of her sisters took the child to her
home. Within a few days, however, the Department of Public
Welfare initiated proceedings to have the child declared abandoned by his sole surviving parent, a judgment to that effect
was rendered, and the child given into the custody of the Department against the opposition of the aunt with actual custody.
Thereafter a second sister of the deceased mother sought to
obtain custody of the child, but she too was denied it, and
denied visitation privileges as well. Aunts by blood are high
on the order of call- and obligation to accept- the tutorship
of children. Here two aunts by blood wished to assume responsibility for the child and were denied it on the ground that
the welfare of the child would be served better by allowing
the child to be disposed of - presumably eventually by way of
8. 167 So. 2d 519 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
9. 167 So. 2d 388 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
10. 178 So. 2d 872 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1905).
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adoption - to other persons. This is too much of a "Big Brother" attitude and a violation of the notion of family which should
be held as sacred as possible for the good of society. It is especially heinous when it appears that "undercover" police officers
are engaged to test the moral fiber of the home of the party
seeking custody. The writer submits too that the child should
not have been considered an abandoned child within the legislation permitting the custody, care, and legal filiation of a child
declared abandoned to be disposed of by the juvenile judge. The
child was being cared for by a relative entitled to claim the
tutorship of the child, and therefore not abandoned by its relatives, even though its father had abandoned it.
Similarly alarming is the decision in State ex rel. Paul v. Department of Public Welfare" in which an illegitimate mother
actually caring for her child and most desirous of doing so was
deprived of its custody on the ground that her mental level was
such that she might not be able to care for it adequately in emergencies. Expert evidence certainly was not unanimous or absolutely clear on her inability to care for the child. Judge Tate,
who noted this in what was in fact a dissenting opinion, concurred in the result on the ground that the child had been out
of its mother's custody so long by the time of the judgment on
appeal that it was better to leave it where it was. The writer
submits that this attitude will only serve to encourage further
inroads on paternal and tutorial authority.
ADOPTION

The decision in Succession of D'Asaro'2 declared null an act
of adoption of a person over seventeen years of age because it
had been recorded in the parish in which the adopter and adoptee
were domiciled rather than in the parish in which it had been
executed. There can be no doubt that R.S. 9:461 requires the
act to be registered in the parish of execution; what may be
doubted is the necessity of concluding that the failure to adhere
to this requirement is a cause of nullity of the act itself between
persons not at all prejudiced by the failure of the registry. The
writer sees two purposes which might be served by registry
of an act of adoption. The first is that evidence of the act itself
will be less easy to ignore, deny, or destroy if there is a change
11. 170 So. 2d 549 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
12. 167 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

of mind by either party. The second is that persons at interest
will be able to acquire knowledge of the existence vel non of an
act of adoption by or of a person. The first purpose, if to be
considered important at all between the persons involved, is
satisfied by registry, even if in a parish other than that specified by law. As to the second purpose, notice, it may be observed
that the failure of registry should hardly be opposable by one
who is not prejudiced by the lack of registry itself, and under
the facts of the case it could not be said that any prejudice had
resulted to the party opposing by reason of the lack of registry.
What may be said about the decision, however, is that the legislation did not clearly require the result reached and, there being
no prejudice to anyone by the failure of registry, the refusal
to recognize the efficacy of the act needlessly destroyed the just
expectations of those involved. Of the legislation itself it may
be observed that, so far as notice is concerned, it would be much
more sensible to require an act of adoption to be recorded in the
parishes in which the adopter and adoptee live, rather than in
the parish of accidental place of execution.

PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
SERVITUDES

Among the servitudes imposed by law, Civil Code article 667
places a limitation upon a person's use of his property in that
"he cannot make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor
of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause
of any damage to him." Sometimes the remedy is an injunction,'
2
or if the harm is already completed the claim is for damages.
Pile-driving operations can cause serious damage to nearby
properties, and article 667 has been applied in such situations.
*Professor fo Law, Louisiana State University.
1. City of New Orleans v. Degelos Bros. Grain Corp., 175 So. 2d 351 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1965)

plant).

(emission of obnoxious and nauseous odors by a dehydrating

Injunction denied for failure to discharge burden of proof, in Woods v.

Turbeville, 168 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
2. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 170 So. 2d 125 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1965).
3. Hauck v. Brunet, 50 So. 2d 495 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951) ; Bruno v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 67 So. 2d 920 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953).

